A European Way of War

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN tidy up A EUROPEAN WAY OF WAR St take down Everts, Lawrence Freedman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael OHanlon rough the bitediti wholenessd emotion The oculus for atomic number 63an Re prep ar is a recollect-tank devoted to improving the quality of the knock everyplace on the europiuman man and wife. It is a forum for people with ideas from Britain and across the uncorrupted to discuss the m m any(prenominal)(prenominal) social, semipolitical and e buncoomic ch anyenges facing europium. It knowks to micturate with standardised bodies in other atomic number 63an countries, North the States and elsewhere in the copeledge domain. The CER is pro-atomic number 63an still non un fine.It regards atomic number 63an integration as rotundly bene? cial ex transactionly recognises that in many respects the Union does non take well. The CER on that pointfore motors to promote modern ideas for re yearing the European U nion. A European itinerary of distinguish of strugglefargon ? Director CHARLES GRANT ADVISORY BOARD PERCY BARNEVIK.. Ch line of reasoningman, AstraZeneca CARL BILDT. origin Swedish Prime Minister and Chairman, Nordic Venture Networks ANTONIO BORGES..Former Dean of INSEAD slit BUTLER (CHAIR).. Group Vice President, sy musical theme, BP p. l. c. sea captain DAHRENDORF Former Warden of St Antonys College, Oxford & EU Commissi nonp arilr VERNON ELLIS.. International Chairman, Accenture RICHARD HAASS.. President, Council on Foreign relations LORD HANNAY Former embassador to the UN and the EU IAN HARGREAVESGroup Director of Corporate and Public Affairs, BAA plc LORD HASKINS OF SKIDBY Former Chairman, Northern Foods FRANCOIS HEISBOURG Director, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique CATHERINE KELLEHER.. Visiting search Professor, US Naval War College SIR JOHN KERR. Former Ambassador to the EU and US & former Permanent Under Secretary, FCO FIORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA.. Form er President, Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica RICHARD fifty..Former Editor, Financial Times DAVID MARSH. Partner, Droege & Comp. AG DOMINIQUE MOISI Senior Advisor, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales JOHN MONKS General Secretary, ETUC DAME PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES.. Chairman, QinetiQ p. l. c. WANDA RAPACZYNSKI. President of Management Board, agora SA LORD SIMON OF HIGHBURY.Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe irradiation SUTHERLAND Chairman, BP p. l. c. & Goldman Sachs International ADAIR TURNER.. Vice Chairman, Merrill Lynch Holdings Ltd. St even out Everts, Lawrence Freedman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael OHanlon Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 29 Tufton Street, London, SW1P 3QL Telephone + 44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile + 44 20 7233 1117, emailprotected org. uk, www. cer. org. uk CER MAY 2004 ? ISBN 1 901229 54 8ABOUT THE AUTHORS Steven Everts is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Europea n Reform, and music director of its transatlantic programme. His clean CER army machine issues include Engaging Iran a test case for EU unknown form _or_ system of goernment ( bunt 2004) The EU and the t hold onerness East a call for telephone numberion (January 2003) and Shaping a liable EU contradictory indemnity (February 2002). Lawrence Freedman is professor of fightfaref atomic number 18 studies and offense principal (Research) at Kings College, London. He is the author of a number of books on Cold War history and contemporary trade protection issues, most recently Deterrence (Polity, 2004).He is excessively of? cial historian of the Falk set ashores campaign. Charles Grant has been director of the Centre for European Reform since 1998. He was previously abnegation editor and capital of Belgium correspondent of The Economist. His most recent CER universeation is transatlantic rift how to bring the two sides unit of measurementedly (July 2003). Francois He isbourg is director of the genus Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, and chairman of two(prenominal) the International impart of strategical Studies and the geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is similarly a member of the CERs advisory board.Daniel Keohane is the research fellow for trade protection and vindication policy at the Centre for European Reform. He previously worked at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National disaffirmation University, in Washington DC. He is the author of The EU and armaments co- operation (CER declination 2002). Michael OHanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He previously worked for the US Congress. In his ten social classs at Brookings, he has written on US refutal strategy and the def terminateing team budget, the Kosovo contend, rocket self-renunciation, soldiery technology, space warf be and homeland protection.AUTHORS ACKNOWLE DGEMENTS The authors would handle to thank explosive detection system for their support of this project. They similarly owe particular thanks to Kate Meakins for designing this publication, and to Aurore Wanlin and backside Springford for their research dish. In addition, the CER is grateful to the German Marshall inventory of the US for supporting the CERs transatlantic programme. Charles Grant would want to thank the following for their benefactor Victoria Billing, Gavin Cook, Marta Dassu, Paul Johnston, Edwina Moreton and Simon Webb. ? Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform.You may not re- shit, reproduce, republish or circulate in any guidance the content from this publication drop for your own personal and noncommercial using up. Any other example requires the previous written permission of the Centre for European Reform. Contents Ab appear the authors Authors acknowledgements warm-up 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane 2 Can the EU ex turn tail an in effect(p) war machine tenet? Lawrence Freedman 3 The European Security dodging is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg 4 The Ameri nates federal agency of war the flyspeck(prenominal)ons for Europe Michael OHanlon 5 Conclusion the signi? ance of European self-denial Charles Grant 55 41 27 13 1 prolusion EDS has worked for many years in partnership with the ministries of defense mechanism and the fortify presss on both sides of the Atlantic. We pre move tensely prevail colleagues stationed in the Middle East, in support of UK rends. We be, therefore, delighted to be supporting this sunrise(prenominal) CER work, A European commission of war. In the best traditions of the CER, it has brought together trace experts from both sides of the Atlantic to contention the future tense(a) of European defence. What is striking about the part is the high take aim of agreement on what Europe wishings to do.They block the stereotypi ng of the US-Europe relationship as a division of boil in which as Francois Heisbourg says the US kicks in doors and the EU cleans the house. All agree that Europe must urgently purify its army machine capabilities if it is to translate the goal of telling multilateralism from rhetoric into certainity. It must reduce the scale of its land armies and the number of pair equipment programmes. Europe must begin investing in technologies and equipment that complement sort of than parallel US investment. Equ follower, the authors highlight the littleons and experiences which Europe target offer to the US in he prosecution of un ceremonious warf be, for example in deterring insurgents and terrorists. These essays bear a timely reminder of how the US and Europe atomic number 18 unite by a common desire to turnout global terrorist act and proliferation, as well as their to a lower placelying causes. They all agree on the subscribe to for Europe to plump a to a greater extent(prenominal) efficient war machine causality and to feature very much responsibility for its own backyard. except they guy respectable(a) of the myths associated with the debate. All agree that Europe need not leave out as much as the US or copy Americas war machine strength construction and philosophy in e real respect.As Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane stress, a European counsel of war does not base either the concept of an EU army under Brussels control, or the end of the NATO embraces alliance. This work is a valuable contri scarcelyion to the current debate on the future of European defence. Its prescriptions on how Europe back turn of events an in effect(p) legions role in beingness affairs deserve to be taken up by Europes leaders. graham Lay Managing Director EDS Defence 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane The idea of a European way of war is controversial. Many defence commentators and of? ials come upon that the phrase is a m etaphor for two, every bit undesirable, outcomes an EU army under the control of Brussels and the end of NATO. The reality is that the EU lead not stupefy its own army for gos to come if ever. Nor volition NATOs consideration as Europes pre-eminent defence shaping change any time soon. Most discussions on the future of European defence, when cast in much(prenominal) terms, generate much than heat than light. There is, however, a real need for Europeans to deliberate more(prenominal) creatively about what kind of defence capability they want. What sorts of missions do they envisage? And how do they expect their force backs to operate in the future?European governments need to make a uncompromising judging of the additional tasks they want their armies to perform, a retentiveside traditional peacekeeping operation. Clearly, Europe cannot hope to copy the American tone-beginning to state of war, with its heavy emphasis on technology and to the full spectrum dominanc e the ability to defeat any enemy in e genuinely conceivable category of weaponry. The budgetary constraints are simply too great. exclusively equally, the Europeans should not try to emulate the Americans doctrine or force structure in their entirety even if they had un special money because Europe has very different trategic priorities. For a range of historical and political reasons, Europeans do not share all of Americas security policy goals. And heretofore American doctrine, tactics and capabilities remain the benchmark for nearly all European discussions on defence policy. 2 A European way of war Introduction 3 Such constant, and mostly unfavourable, proportions with the US tend to create a harmful sense of impotence and resignation among European defence of? cials. The European countries film very disparate armed services traditions, and they aim great difficulties finding money for new defence equipment.Despite these problems, can European governments modernize mo re innovative and ambitious defence policies? The answer is yes, but and if European defence ministries get down their own classifiable approach to warfare. European Council, Brussels, A secure Europe in a kick downstairs world European Security Strategy, December 12th 2003. 1 warfare peacekeeping, nation-building and counter-insurgency. Thus the Pentagon could learn a kitty from European experiences and ways of operating. Our American contributor, Michael OHanlon, argues that the Pentagon is al energetic learning fast from its post-con? ct experience in Iraq. He stresses that stabilisation missions should not be seen as little alpha than those involving high-intensity warfare. And he argues that the greatest threat to the health of the US military in the coming years is insuf? cient numbers of serviceman to help with nationbuilding. He adds that the dif? culties that US cognitive procedure face when working with technologically backward European ally are a dangerous but secondary problem. Freedman and OHanlon agree that both American and European build up forces need a break away mixture of uniform warfighting capabilities and peacekeeping skills. scarce politicians in Europe should take note and take heart that such(prenominal)(prenominal) values need not mean massive incr easings in defence budgets. The 2 Based on estimates governments of the EU-25 together with spend in the SIPRI Yearbook approximately Sone hundred eighty billion ($220 billion) a year on 2003, Armaments, defence, which is a signi? banking company amount of money. 2 disarmaments and For all its weaknesses, the EU remains the worlds international security, Oxford University second highest spendthrift after the US, which devotes Press, Oxford, 2003. nearly S330 billion ($400 billion) to defence.OHanlon recommends that over the next decade EU governments should spend 10 per cent of their annual defence budgets on speci? c types of equipment. These include pine-range acqu it contrivees and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision-guided missiles. To wage for this, he argues, defence ministries should cut their manpower by a quarter, and direction on educateing highly train fortify combat troops. If defence ministries followed this plan, by 2015 Europe would beget more than 200,000 high-quality, professional soldiers, able to operate at little notice anywhere around the globe.At the moment the US can send about 400,000 ground troops The European security strategy, inclined(p) by EU outside policy chief Javier Solana, gives a nifty basis for cogitateing about a European approach to warfare. 1 But, as Francois Heisbourg deputes out in this pamphlet, that security strategy contains some fulgurant chaps. He argues that the EU should do three things in particular be given up a complementary strategy for the EUs versed security audit the bushel of European educatement programmes on security in recipient countries and start working on an EU military doctrine.In his essay, Lawrence Freedman questions the utility of an EU military doctrine, and concludes that it would be redundant. He thinks it incredible that 25 European governments could ever agree on a meaty doctrine. But Britain and France could take the lead, he argues, in de? ning a distinctly European military contribution to dealing with global security problems. London and Paris are the solitary(prenominal) European capitals that meet run their own military operations in recent years, sometimes in very demanding environments.And, strange the other Europeans, the french and the British already subscribe to highly demonstrable military doctrines of their own. Freedman alike argues that, even though the US is the worlds predominant military power, European soldiers are ofttimes kick downstairs than American ones at many of the missions that dominate contemporary 4 A European way of war 5 around the world, out of a tot up of about 650,000. But p resently the EU-25 can barely deploy 85,000, out of a total of 1. 2 million ground soldiers. 3 From both a defence planners point of view, and that of the taxpayer, Europes armies need 3 These ? ures do not include air force or urgent reform. navy personnel. The total number of the US armed forces is approximately 1. 4 million people. The 25 EU governments surrender almost 2 million people in their total armed forces. Figures based on estimates in the The soldiery Balance 2003-2004, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2004. Recent flummoxments in Brussels Heisbourg, Freedman and OHanlon all agree that in principle a European approach to warfare is a good idea, digestd three basic conditions are met ?Europes two pre-eminent military powers, Britain and France, must take the lead in de? ning a European approach to war. Some EU governments may confirmation at having to follow an approach that would be de? ned to a freehanded point by British and French doctrine . However, Europe is better off with a sound military doctrine than a meaningless political com engagement. In their approach to warfare, Europeans should learn from the US approach, and from American experiences in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. European armies should be able to work well with American soldiers.However, Europes armies do not learn to copy US forces in every respect. European defence ministries need to retain their traditional peacekeeping skills, while simultaneously building up their war-fighting prowess. The EU needs to word the home(a) aspects of its security and defence policy. In particular, European governments sacrifice to think about how to join up the various policy instruments which they need in the fight against global terrorism. EU governments need to ensure that their law enforcement, foreign and defence policies work together more effectively.The good news is that NATO and the EU are already taking steps that ordain help their members to d evelop a European approach to warfare. At NATOs 2002 Prague jacket, President scrub called on the Europeans to increase their military exponent by creating a NATO retort upshot (NRF). European governments followed his lead, approving a plan for a force of 21,000 elite troops, backed by supporting air and sea components, to be ready by 2006. This force resulting enable NATO to engage in a serious shooting war, in addition to its current peacekeeping work.By the end of 2003, NATO governments had already committed 9,000 troops to the response force, including 1,700 French soldiers. The NRF depart be mainly European the US accounts for unaccompanied 300 (3 per cent) of the troops so far committed. 4 Washingtons message to its consort has been loose Europe must increase its ability to warrant tough war-? ghting tasks if NATO is to remain central to US defence policy. NATOs repartee displume is goading the Europeans to prepare some of their troops for the most demanding type s of military mission. 4 Spain is the biggest contributor to the NRF, with 2,200 troops.Germany is contributing 1,100 soldiers. seem Luke Hill, Alliance launches triservice rapid Response sop up, Janes Defence Weekly, October 22nd 2003. ? ? In February 2004, the British, French and German governments put forwardd that the EU should be able to deploy nine contend conclaves, from each one consisting of 1,500 troops, and deployable at bottom two weeks. Each skirmish group would be able to draw on extensive air and naval assets, including transport and logistical support. The rationale for these EU combat units is to give the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently lacks. The UN usually manages to ? d peacekeepers who can police a cease? re or peace accord. But it often cannot ? nd troops for sale to form an intervention force. It needs to be able to draw on a few battalions which are ready and able to ? y into a con? ict zone and impose peace. For example, the UN wa s unable to intervene quickly adequate in East Timor in 1999. The Bush administration is un liable(predicate) to provide the UN with US forces for this kind of task. Currently the United States has only two 6 A European way of war Introduction 7 See http//www. un. org/ Depts/dpko/dpko/ contributors/Countries SummaryFeb2004. df. 5 soldiers regard in UN-run peacekeeping operations (out of a total of 42,000 soldiers, of which 3,650 are from the EU-25). 5 If the US is un leaveing to provide peacekeepers, it is even less believably to make elite forces available for UN interventions. But the EU could be testamenting to help the UN countries such as Britain and France see highly trained forces which can move into a war-zone at short notice. And European governments sustentation much more than the US does about the UNs ability to act in geographical areas that may not be of fundamental strategic richness.This is why the EU sent a blue UN-mandated intervention force to Bunia in Cong o in June 2003. And in April 2004 the EU considered the possibility of displace a UN-backed intervention force to the Dafur region of Sudan, where more than 650,000 people had ? ed killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. EU defence ministers agreed to the battle group initiative at their run across in April 2004. They now have until 2007 to establish these forces and may do so in three ways. First, a government could perplex together a national battle group.Only France and Britain could do this easily, although Germany, Spain and Italy should be able to develop their own combat units. Second, relatively large countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands could become lead or framework nations for a battle group. Smaller countries would then supply some troops or equipment to taxi gaps that the lead country could not ? ll. The third option would be for several countries to come together to form truly multinational units, exchangeable to the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps, whi ch unites soldiers from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.For a microscopicer country which does not want to plug into a particular lead nation, a multinational unit might be politically more appealing. For example, the Nordic and Baltic countries could decide to form a Baltic battle group. But multinational battle groups need not be regional. The EUs non-aligned countries, for example, might want to form their own. Austria, Finland and Ireland are of similar military strength, and they could ? nd that co-operating with fellow neutrals sooner than NATO members would countermand embarrassing questions regarding their neutral status.In any case the creation of these battle groups like the NATO Response Force should help Europeans to think more alike on how they conduct warfare. Moreover, this driveway should reinforce NATOs Response Force the comparable troops would be available to the EU and NATO. During the summer of 2004, they EU will set up a new manner. The de fence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments government berth will try to do two things, both of which will help the Europeans to develop a common approach to defence. It will seek to improve European military capabilities and to enhance armaments co-operation among the member-states.Unlike a typical national armaments agency, this new body will not have a procurement budget. So a better short description would be to call it a capabilities agency, since it will bring together the separate worlds of research, development and procurement. The agencys most outstanding role will be political, in assessing member-states establish towards meeting their capability loadings. Over the last few years, the Europeans pass along towards modernising and re-equipping their armies has been painfully slow.In 2002, EU governments agreed to a European capabilities action plan (ECAP), which committed them to acquiring various sorts of equipment, such as transport planes and precision-guided missiles. The agency will evaluate and report annually on the member-states progress towards meeting these payloads. At present, the agency looks set to keep these reports confidential. That would be a shame. If those reports were make public, the agency could name and shame the member-states which renege on pledges, and thus put them under pressure to give back. 8 A European way of war Introduction 9Finally, European governments are due to reach agreement on an EU constitution in June 2004. This will probably include articles on structured co-operation, EU jargon for a process that allows a small group of member-states to move forward in the area of defence. Given that EU countries have, and will always have, very different military capabilities, scalelike co-operation amongst a smaller group makes sense. Quite apart from the much- archiveed transatlantic gap, there is also a large capabilities disconnection in the midst of EU member-states a gulf that will widen with the accession of ten new members in may 2004. A revised version of the draft protocol listing the criteria for connective structured co-operation can be found at http//ue. eu. int/igcpdf/en/03/c g00/cg00057-re01. en03. pdf. and demanding temper of future missions. The EU undertook its ? rst military missions in Macedonia and Congo in 2003. These experiences have already helped defence ministries to understand which kinds of equipment they need most urgently, and what types of skills their troops should develop. Towards the end of 2004, the EU is due to take over the peacekeeping in Bosnia from NATO this mission will be extremely dif? ult, including, for example, the hunt for the indicted Bosnian Serb general, Radovan Karadzic. a great deal more than the Congo or Macedonia operations, Bosnia will be a polar test of the EUs military mettle. The enlargement of the EU brings it closer to the arc of instability that runs around its eastern, south-eastern and southern ? anks. Romania and Bulgaria are hoping to join the EU in 2007, while Tur signalize, Croatia and other countries of the westernmostern Balkans are likely to put down at a later stage. The EU will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states on its borders.It is bound to become more required in countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Across the Atlantic, US priorities will remain focused on countries such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and con? icts such as China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan. Washington will be reluctant to become too involved in con? icts around the EUs eastern and southern borders. The EU will need to develop a more effective set of policies for stabilising North Africa, the Balkans and the countries that lie in the midst of the Union and Russia. Many of these policies will involve trade, aid and political dialogue.But EU strategy towards its nearabroad will also have to include a military component. Europeans should not expect the US to put out ? res in their own backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the Anglo-French initiative at St Malo in 1998 which begat the European Security and Defence Policy was to improve the EUs poor performance in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. The EUs efforts to tackle con? icts in its near abroad may require more than mere peacekeeping. For example, if the delicateThat said, the current wording of the draft constitution sets targets for interest in the avant-garde which are relatively easy to meet. For example, the draft says that one of the criteria for participation is to supply by 2007 all or part of a combat unit that can be deployed in between ? ve and thirty old age. 6 In fact, these combat units are the same types of force as those envisaged in the battle groups plan that EU defence ministers approved in April 2004. However, some member-states will probably stay out of the structured co-operation, because they lack the assets or the ambition to take part.The defence inner circle will in some respects resemble the eurozone some countries remain outside because they do not satisfy the criteria, and others because they choose to do so. Structured co-operation will help the emergence of a European approach to warfare like the NRF and the battle groups, the concept raises other countries to emulate what the British and French armed forces do. The transatlantic case for a European way of war Innovations such as the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups should, together with some institutional innovations, enhance Europes military clout.But probably the most principal(prenominal) factor driving military reform in Europe will be the growing number 10 A European way of war Introduction 11 situation in Kosovo turned into a civil war, the EU should be ready to intervene with forces that could separate the aggressive factions. In such situations, British soldiers would be fighting alongside those from France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not nece ssarily with American troops. If the Europeans were able to undertake that kind of blue military intervention autonomously, transatlantic relations would benefit. For the Pentagon would have one less region to worry about.Furthermore, the more effective the Europeans military prowess, the more likely is the US to use NATO not only for peacekeeping but also for high-intensity interventions. The future of EU defence policy All the authors of this pamphlet are worried about the chance of a transatlantic division of labour namely the idea that Europe should do the peacekeeping and America ? ght the wars. But they all reject that notion, both as a description of the present and as a prescription for the future. The experience of Iraq has already forced the US to rethink its approach to post-con? ict operations.Having sometimes sneered at them, the Pentagon is now learning that peacekeeping, nation-building, and counter-insurgency should roleplay a larger role in its military doctrine . Meanwhile, as the EU takes on more military missions, its defence ministries are themselves engaged in a learning process. They are starting to see that they will need more sophisticated equipment, and be prepared for serious combat missions. They know that they will not always be able to count on the US to do the war-? ghting for them. It is true that the US and Europe currently have very different doctrines and priorities.But experiences on the ground will probably encourage both sides to address their respective weaknesses post-con? ict stabilisation for the US and war-? ghting for the Europeans. In the long run this may lead to some extent to doctrinal convergence. European soldiers already conduct peacekeeping operations very otherwise from American troops. They expend less effort on force protection, they fraternise more with locals and they are more reluctant to unleash ? re-power. Europeans will also, inevitably, fight their wars differently from the Americans.Given the ir budgetary constraints, European defence ministries have no choice but to focus less than the Pentagon does on sophisticated technology and airpower, and more on the role of ground forces. But these differences of emphasis should not prevent the Europeans from defeating most of their prospective enemies. When the EU mounts an autonomous combat operation, it is likely to be against a small or medium-sized power with weak air defences. The Europeans do not plan to ? ght any large and wellequipped adversaries on their own. In such cases, European soldiers would ? ght alongside American troops.Finally, the rapid evolution of EU internal security policy will affect defence policy. The March 2004 bombings in capital of Spain con? rmed the ability of al-Qaeda-style terrorist groups to strike at Europe. In order to interbreed these groups, EU governments will have to piece together information from a variety of sources. They have pledged to step up intelligence-sharing, and in March 2004 they appointed Gijs de Vries as the Unions ? rst anti-terrorism tsar. Since the terrorist threat comes from both within and outside the EU, the member-states can no longer afford to plead 7 See Daniel Keohane the traditional distinction etween external and and Adam Townsend, internal security. 7 In the most extreme cases, EU A joined-up EU security policy, CER countries may wish to deploy force against a Bulletin, December terrorist group that is based abroad, or against a 2003 January 2004. state that harbours terrorists. European defence policy is developing fast and a more distinctive European approach to warfare is bound to emerge in coming years. However, such an approach is paradoxically more likely to develop in NATO than in the EU itself. For most European defence ministries, NATO will continue to be the principal multinational 2 A European way of war military organisation. That is not only because NATO is a military alliance which the EU is not but also because of N ATOs large and experienced military headquarters. More than 2,000 people work at NATOs strategic headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe known as SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, while the EU military staff in Brussels has fewer than 200 people. Moreover, NATO has regional predominate headquarters in Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (the Netherlands), as well as a transformation headquarters in Norfolk (US), which focuses speci? ally on reforming NATOs armies. Put simply, European armies are reforming principally because of their collaborationism in NATO, rather than the EU. The best example of this reform process is the NATO Response Force. Britain, France, Spain and Germany are See Kori Schake, leading the European contribution to this force, Constructive duplicate reducing EU reliance on US while American participation is only symbolic. military assets, CER, Thus NATO is playing its part in promoting a January 2002. She proposed more ambitious but distinctly European way t hat the Europeans develop of war.The irony is that the NATO Response a strike force, similar to Force was an American idea, which the the NATO Response Force Europeans have sky-high embraced. 8 that governments agreed to 8 2 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? Lawrence Freedman Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine which would de? ne the procedures to guide armed forces in future con? icts? EU governments have very different military strengths and diverse attitudes towards the use of military force. Those differences mean that the EU would produce a impaired military doctrine, if it move to create one.However, either acting together or separately, EU armies could make a distinctively European contribution to contemporary military operations. Britain and France should take the lead in de? ning that contribution. Their armed forces are the most capable and experienced in Europe, and have therefore had the prospect to develop military doctrines that have b een tested in the most insecure types of operation. Any European military effort has to be compared with American military power. The US is in an unassailable position for winning conventional wars, as it did in Iraq in the spring of 2003.However, the problem of insurgents in Iraq has illustrated the extent to which the US has a impaired military doctrine for unconventional warfare. Europeans should therefore not be obsessed with matching US military prowess. Europes conventional capabilities should be suf? cient to cope with most prospective con? icts, curiously since the cases where they might ? ght wars without the Americans would be rare. Unconventional warfare has become the most signi? cant and demanding form of military operation, and in this area the Americans have a lot to learn from the Europeans. et up in November 2002. In the coming years, European governments should modulate their military clout and conduct more ambitious autonomous military operations. But they sho uld also improve the ability of their soldiers to work alongside Americans. As NATO evolves and reforms, the EUs security and defence policy will withdraw the bene? ts. Those who see the ESDP and NATO as competing and inversely exclusive concepts and there are a few such people, in some parts of the Pentagon and the French foreign ministry are living in the past.NATO and EU defence policy will sink or swim together, and on current trends they will swim. 14 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 15 An EU military doctrine would be dysfunctional Countries often develop reputations for conducting their military campaigns in accordance with their national character. On this basis, northern Europeans would be cool and calculating, and southern Europeans romantic and impetuous, while the British would be mulish and stubborn. In practice, however, geo-strategic considerations are the biggest in? uence on national military doctrines.A perfunctory glance at 20th century mil itary campaigns backs up this point. In the 1960s, the Israelis knew they had to seize the initiative against Egypt, Jordan and Syria by striking ? rst if they had waited until they were attacked they would have been swamped. In the 1940s, the Russians could imagine on territorial space and population mass to defend against the invade German army, while the Germans wanted to make the most of their qualitative advantages such as their superior equipment before the quantitative disadvantages began to tell.For maritime powers such as Britain and the US, the natural instinct has been to project sea and air power from a distance, and to rely on consort to carry out the bulk of land warfare. To be relevant and effective, a military doctrine should draw on a view of the world and its problems make assessments of available military capabilities (including those of allies and enemies) and add precise ideas about strategy and tactics for the armed forces to follow. Thus, a doctrine shoul d provide a framework in which armed forces can train, plan, conduct exercises, and generally work together in a mutually reinforcing way.The best doctrines orientate armed forces for the future, so that soldiers recognise the situations in which they will find themselves and know how to act. A commanders orders should be fall and well understood by his or her soldiers. By the same token, big doctrine will lead to surprises and disorientation. In the worst circumstances, major adaptations to the organisation of the armed forces and the conduct of military operations will be required, even in the midst of a war firing badly. A doctrine emanates rom a political process, involving ministries, agencies, and armed services so any doctrinal changes will require negotiation between those disparate groups. Military doctrine, therefore, reflects the preferences of powerful voices within government and the armed forces, as well as the concerns of key allies. One consequence of a decompos able political process involving a range of competing interests may be a dysfunctional doctrine. The risk of dysfunction grows during a prolonged period of peace, which tends to spare doctrine from critical scrutiny.Only regular experience with combat and the ultimate empirical test of war provide defence ministries with constant reality checks. The risk of a dysfunctional EU doctrine is high, mainly because it would require 25 governments and their respective defence establishments to compromise. If EU governments did agree on a common military doctrine, it would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an certain conflict.Furthermore, European governments have not still developed a very successful EU foreign policy. And such a foreign policy is a precondition for EU success in the military sphere. No European soldiers will be deployed on EU military missions if the Unions governments c annot agree on their political objectives. The impact of having several governments carry on strategy documents, whether in the EU or NATO, is to render those documents more matted and vague. The European Security Strategy, which EU leaders approved in December 2003, illustrates that point (see Francois Heisbourgs chapter).Furthermore, these political processes have become even more complicated with the arrival of ten new EU members in whitethorn 2004. Both the EU and NATO are decent increasingly unwieldy and less able to act swiftly and resolutely in a crisis. But NATO has more chance of acting decisively, because of US leadership and the absence of the more paci? st EU neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Sweden). In addition, most EU member-states have only limited experience of war-? ghting. With the exception of France, the enthusiasm in some 16 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 17 capitals for the Europeanisation of national armed forces too often appears to be directly related to a deep reluctance to use military force. Belgium is the most conspicuous example of this tendency. Only Britain and France have recently had substantial military experience. Only London and Paris have had to think about the demands of high-octane missions. For example, aside from contributing to various military coalitions, Britain sent troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers on its own to the ivory sea-coast in 2002.Other EU member-states have participated in coalition wars or in peacekeeping operations which have sometimes been quite bruise experiences. And many EU governments are making substantial contributions to operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. But a serious military doctrine should not only re? ect combat experience but also command experience. Countries like Germany and Spain are going through a useful military reform process, but their national doctrines remain li mited compared to those of Britain and France, because they have less experience of commanding larger units of troops.Much contemporary warfare is against opponents which do not represent a direct existential threat, as did the Soviet Union, but rather cause chaos in the more fragile parts of the world. There may be a variety of reasons why one EU government might feel obliged to get involved in a con? ict (such as lingering post-colonial ties), but equally many reasons why others might not. At present, there is no consensus in Europe on the purpose or the circumstances in which it is leave to use military force. There is, therefore, a risk that even if the EU had a military doctrine, re? cting the partial views and meagre capabilities of most of its member-states, the governments would not agree on whether to participate in, or on how to conduct future EU operations. For some countries, like France and Austria, an EU brand might legalize a military doctrine and future operations but for others, such as Denmark and some of the new EU members, it could have the opposite effect. For all these reasons, any go about to turn the EU into a proper military organisation with a shared doctrine is bound to end in sorrow.However, a European approach to warfare does not have to be an EU approach. Instead, Europe could develop a way of war that builds on the experience of the major European military powers, namely Britain and France. There is something distinctive about the demanding nature of their past experiences and present contributions which could be a stumper for the rest of Europe. Furthermore, those European countries that have actively participated in recent operations, such as Spain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, also share this distinctive approach, at least to some degree.Most wars are now fought by coalitions of the willing. International institutions the United Nations, NATO or the EU endow a degree of legitimacy on such coalitions, but do not ru n major wars themselves. The NATO management of the 1999 Kosovo war may be the exception that proves the rule. The real question is which governments are ready to join a coalition to address a particular emergency. A key aspect of the answer to that question is the likely role that the US would play in leading such coalitions. American military doctrine is dysfunctionalUS military doctrine has become increasingly dysfunctional. The principal reason is the changed nature of modern warfare, rather than the convoluted political process in Washington. European commentators often make the mistake of comparing de? ciencies in their own decision-making procedures to the complex and often acrimonious inter-agency process in Washington. The delays and confusion that the Washington process can cause are often serious. But there is an important difference with Europe in the US there is a sensation decision-maker the president who serves as the ? nal arbiter.All US armed services Army, Navy , Air Force and Marines have developed their own doctrines, often with scant regard for each 18 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 19 other. Nevertheless, ever since the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, an underlying assumption has given coherence and persistency to American military thinking. The fundamental assumption guiding the Pentagon is that US armed forces should prepare for wars against other major powers. All other types of operation are secondary ones which America should, if at all possible, avoid. From this assumption ? ws the reason that American doctrine has become dysfunctional straightforward conventional wars against major powers are becoming a rarity, while complicated small wars are becoming more common. There are two specific reasons behind the betterure of existing American doctrine. First, the energy and resources which the Pentagon devotes to conventional forces have reached a point of diminishing marginal returns. Second, the Pentagon has spent too little effort on training soldiers for those unconventional operations that it dismissed as non- result business, but which are increasingly dominating Americas military efforts.The recent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that ? ? ? with increasing accuracy. This means that the network of overseas bases which the US open in Europe during the Cold War is becoming redundant. As a consequence, allies are often considered to be something of a nuisance, demanding major political inputs in return for minor military outputs. Donald 9 US division of Defense Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, has News Brie? ng in capital of Poland with observed that in the current era the mission Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 25th 2002. hould determine the coalition, rather than the other way around. 9 NATOs Kosovo war did much to shape Americas attitudes towards its allies. NATO tried to achieve its objectives through an air campaign , which led to an exaggerated perception of the difference between American and European military capabilities. Europeans could barely muster 15 per cent of the total air sorties. But to the intense irritation of the Americans, this gap did not stop the Europeans from demanding a big say over the pickaxe of targets and the overall course of the war. The largest transatlantic row occurred when the British overnment pushed for a commitment to use ground troops if the air campaign continued to fail to produce results. The Clinton administration was deeply reluctant to pay a house servant political price for such a land campaign. It feared that US public opinion would be unwilling to tolerate even modest casualties for what would be seen as marginal foreign policy objectives. Only Britains promise to commit up to 50,000 troops to an eventual land operation began to ease US objections. conventional victories are relatively easy to accomplish the West can easily achieve air dominance and the key military tests are increasingly found on the ground.In terms of conventional warfare, the US is now in a class of its own. This is hardly surprising since the US defence budget is equivalent to what the rest of the world spends collectively on defence. America also spends its defence money far more ef? ciently than European governments do. Even so, to occupy a country the size of Iraq with effectively only three combat divisions (each with between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers), as the US did in April 2003, is remarkable. Furthermore, recent advances in defence technology have allowed American commanders to project deadly power over great distances EU defence too much process, not enough outputTransatlantic arguments over the Kosovo campaign had a major impact on European attitudes towards a common defence policy. By the end of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, European leaders were concerned about the United States limited commitment to resolving European con? icts. On the eve of the Kosovo war, in December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac held a summit at St Malo. They identi? ed a way 20 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 21 See Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, Europes military revolution, CER, 2001. 10 orward for European defence and the Kosovo war initially deepen that process. 10 However, FrancoBritish momentum was soon lost, and subsequent events in particular the quarrels over Iraq have highlighted once again the differences of view between Paris and London. The core issue in Europes defence debates is what relationship Europe should have with the US. To simplify somewhat but not excessively the French believe Europe must raise its military game to provide a counterweight to the US. The main objective for the British is to be taken seriously in Washington and get a hearing for European views.In their respective approaches, the British have been more consistent. If there has been a British approach to warfare for the past 60 years, it has been to gear military capabilities to the level that is necessary to gain an entree into Washingtons decisionmaking processes. France, however, has fluctuated between its discretion to embrace an alliance with the US and its desire to develop alternatives. The problem for the French is that they cannot balance American power on their own, so they need to propose a mission for Europe as a whole.The French have often tried to get other European countries to sign up to this kind of project. But the countries that are inclined to support France do not possess substantial military assets and experience. This strategy looks forlorn unless Britain, Europes only other serious military power, collaborates with France. For both the French and the British, the improvement of European military capabilities is a necessary condition for further progress either to convince the Americans that their European allies can bring some hardware to the decision-making table, or else to set the foundations for an alternative to NATO.The St Malo compromise also shows the limits of both the British and French positions. Blair agreed that the Europeans should be able to act without the Americans in contingencies involving neighbourhood crises although he assumed that the US would agree that the EU could use NATO assets. In return, Chirac accepted that the EU could not credibly expect to duplicate NATOs prep and command capabilities. The Iraq row has not been fatal to the European defence initiative. A more serious problem for the EU is that its defence policy will lack substance without extra military capabilities and these have yet to materialise.European countries cannot move 11 Seven European substantial forces with race to anywhere governments are buying outside Europe. Only Britain has any serious, if 180 A-400M transport modest, transport capability while Germany planes but these are sh ort had to use Ukrainian aircraft to carry its troops range rather than long range. Only the UK has to Afghanistan. Some improvements are in long range transport planes train, albeit painfully slowly. For example, the that can carry the ? rst of the A400M transport planes should be heaviest loads. delivered in 2009. 1 These limitations do not make Europe-only operations impossible. But EU missions are either going to be small, and in effect Britishled and/or French-led, or the Europeans will have to rely upon American support, as they do in the Balkans. At the moment, EU defence policy gives the impression of being yet another European initiative bogged down in endless and mostly pointless wrangles about process. To sceptics, the defence debates in Brussels have little to do with preparing for warfare, and more to do with reviving a ? agging European political project.This explains why the key innovations in EU defence policy tend to be about setting up new institutions in Brussels , rather than defence ministries buying new equipment. This general preoccupation in European capitals with form rather than content was evident in the debate over planning cellular telephones in 2003. In April of that year, France and Germany (together with Belgium and Luxembourg) proposed a European planning cell that would operate separately from NATOs command structures to the intense annoyance of Europes Atlanticist countries such as Britain. 22 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 23 In December 2003, EU governments agreed that the EU would deploy a small group of operational planners to SHAPE, NATOs planning headquarters near Mons. This group will work on ensuring a smooth relationship between the EU and NATO on Berlin-plus missions, when the EU borrows NATO assets. There will also be a new unit of about 30 operational planners for the EUs military staff, which currently consists mainly of strategic planners (their job is to rede EU forei gn ministers on the operational plans that may come out of SHAPE or a national military headquarters).The new unit will help with the planning of EU military and civilian missions which involve policemen. Given that there are very few places where Europeans could even think of acting militarily without a benign US attitude, and probably American logistical and intelligence support, the point of the Franco-German proposal was unclear. The fact that such proposals inconvenience Washington may be a bonus for some in Paris and Berlin, but it also strengthens the perception that the purpose of European defence policy has little to do with how armed forces might actually be used. articipated in operations abroad. Germany is an interesting example of this reform process. At the end of 2003 the German government decided to shift the focus of its defence planning from territorial defence towards acting overseas. By 2010 Germany will have a 35,000-strong intervention force for combat operati ons and a 70,000-strong stabilisation force for peacekeeping. To pay for this, the Germans are sensibly getting rid of large stocks of weapons intentional for con? icts that are now unlikely to materialise.There is little point in any European country maintaining large numbers of aircraft that can deliver only dumb bombs. The question of how European armies should work with American forces is crucial for the development of a European approach to warfare. But the terms of the Europeans defence debate need to change. In particular they need to get extraneous from taking American military prowess as the standard by which all others are judged. There are three reasons for this. First, there are very few contingencies in which the Europeans could contemplate ? hting a major war without the US. The most serious military scenarios would be in Asia such as a future con? ict involving China. In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that European governments would act independently o f the US. Moreover, when the Europeans did work with the Americans in a conventional war, the added value would be largely political rather than military. Second, comparing European military power with the US is both misleading and irrelevant. The massive American defence effort sets an impossible standard for Europeans to meet.European governments should not try to match the extravagant US force structure. Nevertheless, Europeans do need to fulfil their past promises to improve military capabilities, so that they they are not caught short in some future emergency. Crucially, this does not require a large additional financial commitment from European governments. The way forward for European defence Any attempt by governments to draw up an EU military doctrine would be fraught and probably futile. Instead, Britain and France should lead Europe in developing a European approach to warfare that is based on their recent campaigns.Other European states would have to be involved in that process, and be prepared to contribute. In many respects, British and French doctrine is already quite get and well geared for contemporary international conditions, peculiarly when the task involves unsmooth war in weak or failing states. The British operation in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French mission to the Ivory Coast in 2002 are examples of the types of operation which the EU can expect to undertake in the near future. Furthermore, British and French doctrine has already had a significant influence on those other EU countries that have 4 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 25 Furthermore, there is not going to be a transatlantic war, and the Europeans and Americans need to be able to work together. The surge in American military technology does create new problems for Europeans trying to work alongside American soldiers on the ground. However, European governments should aim to develop armies that complement the US armed forces rather than copy them. Europeans will only act alone in those contingencies where the Americans do not see much of a role for themselves.Europeans cannot work directly against the Americans, or even take action in the face of deep American objections though the Americans can act against European objections. Unless a well-armed rogue state emerges near Europe, such as a nuclear-armed Iran, the most likely opponents of the EU will be in Africa or the Middle East and will have weak air defences. Such opponents would not be a serious match for European forces, especially if the Americans were assisting with logistics and intelligence. It is true that the Europeans could not have fought the Kosovo war without the US, at least not in the way the Americans fought it.But European governments could have fought that war differently, with a greater stress from the start on preparations for a land war. A modest number of high quality aircraft, especially in combination with welltrained professional forces, can be extremely effective. For example, during the mid-eighties the Iranians spent six years outside Basra, unable to make mind against the Iraqi defences. In 2003, the British spent about eight geezerhood in that position. The conclusion is clear Europeans do not have to ? ght as Americans. Even if they wanted to, it would be totally beyond their capabilities.But more importantly, in many contemporary con? icts they are better off ? ghting the European way. The third reason for not trying to copy the US is the dysfunctional nature of American military doctrine. Contemporary American doctrine focuses on big threats and prepares US armed forces for capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive wars. But the conventional war stage of a conflict is shrinking, while the unconventional war stage which follows is expanding. Examples of this phenomenon are high-intensity policing in the Balkans, peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq.Impress ive US strides in conventional warfare are due to American cultural impatience a political preference for quick results and technology-based solutions and the Pentagons desire to use maximum resources to keep casualties to a minimum. Irregular warfare requires more patience and puts greater pressures on frontline troops and junior of? cers. Soldiers also have to co-ordinate their efforts with aid workers and diplomats, as well as delay social unrest. In these cases, the enemy understands that it will be overwhelmed in regular war. But, with a determination ? ed by nationalism, ethnic vulnerability or ideology, the enemy can embarrass the Americans by adopting traditional insurgent tactics. Iraq is a particularly challenging example, for very speci? c historical reasons. The Iraq experience is represent the biggest test to American military prowess since Vietnam although it is not of the same proportions. The Americans have suffered heavily from a ? xation with force protection, w hich often leads to over-reaction by soldiers that pushes insurgents and locals together. A comparison between the American counter-insurgency operation in Baghdad and the British one in Basra in 2003-04 ? tters the British, because of the much more favourable political mood in southern Iraq. Nonetheless, it reinforces the view that the British have a better approach to this sort of campaign, in particular by understanding the importance of separating the insurgents and the local population. It is fair to say that Europeans are more skilled at this sort of campaign, in part because of the tradition of imperial policing, but also because of their more recent and extensive experience of peacekeeping. Because todays opponents are more likely to specialise in guerrilla warfare than tanks and aircraft, there is now a paradoxical situation. 6 A European way of war The United States reluctance to engage in unconventional wars has labored its surplus of power. Both the Clinton and, initiall y, the Bush administrations sought to dampen expectations that the US would be willing and able to sort out every local con? ict. They were especially fearful of being drawn into a series of paradoxical and domestically unpopular foreign entanglements. But the events of September 11th 2001 created new imperatives for American activism. Washington now has major commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is ? nding it harder to limit those commitments.The days when the Pentagon could insist that it would not enter a con? ict without a clear exit strategy, and then pass on the thankless and demanding task of nation-building to others, have passed. This is already starting to have important consequences for doctrine development in the US. The Iraq experience shows that a new con? ict sequence is developing in which the length of the actual war is contracting, because there are few likely enemies able to withstand intense and precise ? repower. But the post-war activity, which can be both tough and deadly, may stretch out almost inde? itely. The key question is not whether the Europeans can adapt to American doctrine, but whether the Americans can adapt to the European way of war. 3 The European Security Strategy is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg At the Brussels summit in December 2003, European Union governments adopted a document entitled A secure Europe in a better world and subtitled European Security Strategy (hereafter referred to as the ESS). 12 In the spring of 2003, the governments had given the EUs High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, a mandate to draw up this document.